Posted on

US-Israel shadow war on Iran continues with the threat of snapback sanctions

There’s a lot the media isn’t telling us about US and Israeli relations with Iran. Carol Turner traces Trump’s approach, the controversial history of snapback sanctions, and demands an end to nuclear hypocrisy.

The fragile ceasefire that followed the US and Israel’s military assault on Iran is holding, for now at least, while Benjamin Netanyahu’s attention is focussed on his endgame for Gaza. The western media lens, which shifted away from Iran after the 12-day military campaign in June, recently returned with the announcement that Britain, France, and Germany (E3) are initiating snapback sanctions. 

During the 12-day attack, Trump and Netanyahu claimed their aim was preventing Iran’s imminent development of nuclear weapons. President Trump has repeatedly insisted Iran is a few weeks away from having a nuclear bomb. Throughout the 12 days, Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) insisted there was no evidence Iran was developing nuclear weapons. He told the UN Security Council: “The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.”  

US and Israel’s strategic goals

Though militarily weakened by this and other recent attacks, and despite the economic strain caused by international sanctions, Iran is still a powerful obstacle to Trump’s strategic goal in the region. Trump’s goal being to normalise relations between Israel and its regional neighbours. Iran is also a chief obstacle in the way of Netanyahu’s attempts to quell Palestinian opposition and strengthen Israel’s grip on the Middle East. 

Israel is explicitly seeking regime change, quietly supported by the United States. On day one of the June attack, Netanyahu appealed to the people of Iran to rise up against the regime, and he continues to do so. 

The breadth of targets in June not only included nuclear research facilities, fuel enrichment plants, and nuclear power plants, but also Iran’s air defences, and other military and civilian facilities. Israel’s Defence Force (IDF) assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists, politicians, and military leaders. Images broadcast by Iranian state media have exposed Israel’s covert operations inside Iran before the attacks – showing the deployment of Israeli agents and extensive use of small drones in the opening hours of the June offensive. 

The Israel-Iran ceasefire may be holding, but the shadow war with Iran continues. In a StW-CND webinar during the military bombardment, General Secretary of the TSSA rail union Maryam Eslamdoust, speaking in a personal capacity, explained what this means. The bombardment, she said, was not only a military campaign but also a psychological and propaganda campaign. 

Trump’s objectives

Trump’s so-called nuclear talks go deeper than Iran’s potential for a nuclear weapons programme. They seek to further limit the development of a civil nuclear power programme (which all nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatories are entitled to pursue), end Iran expanding drone and ballistic missile capabilities, and its support for a network of regional proxies. Within weeks of taking office in January this year, Trump  signed National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM2) which turned those objectives into a directive to all offices of state. 

Trump also announced a campaign of ‘secondary sanctions’ aimed at countries buying oil and gas from Iran, suggesting US businesses will not be allowed to trade with these countries. This campaign is mainly aimed – with little success – at China which accounts for around 90% of Iran’s oil exports. In April Trump also imposed secondary sanctions on countries importing oil from Venezuela, again aimed at China. 

Trump’s approach to Iran’s nuclear weapons potential contrasts with that of President Obama, which resulted in the Iran nuclear deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), widely regarded as a successful arms limitation agreement. It lifted nuclear-related sanctions on Iran in return for a commitment by Iran to restrict its civil nuclear programme and permit rigorous International Atomic Energy Association (IAEL) inspections. Germany and the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council – US, UK, China, Russia, and France – as well as Iran were signatories to the JCPoA. 

The agreement was codified in UNSC Resolution 2231 of 2015.  However, Trump effectively killed the JCPoA in his first presidential term by withdrawing the US from the JCPoA in 2018 and de-certifying UNSC 2231, claiming Iran was developing nuclear weapons. 

Snapback sanctions

Multiple IAEA inspection reports at that time confirmed Iran was adhering to the terms of the agreement. These reports were universally accepted, including by US authorities. In 2020, however, even though the US was no longer party to the JCPoA, Trump invoked a ‘snapback’ mechanism in UNSC 2231, claiming Iran was failing to honour the agreement and calling for the UN to reimpose sanctions. 

The UNSC president at that time blocked Trump’s attempt to activate snapback, citing a lack of consensus in the Security Council, after which Trump imposed US sanctions on Iran. A year later the E5 followed suit. Unlike the US, however, they remained parties to the JCPoA and UNSC 2231. Despite objections by other P5 Security Council members, a year later Britain, France, and Germany followed suit and reimposed sanctions. 

The above events, in outline, are the basis for continuing claims by Russia and China that sanctions on Iran are illegal – a position they reiterated as recently as March this year. A joint statement by China, Russia, and Iran, called for restraint not escalation – emphasising their support for UNSC 2331 and the need to uphold the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Iran’s right to civil nuclear power as a signatory, and calling for the removal of unlawful sanctions on Iran. 

Iran responded to the US and E3 sanctions imposed during Trump’s first term by exceeding the agreed limits on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and enriching uranium in higher concentrations. It must be noted that these higher levels of uranium enrichment were not high enough for their use in a nuclear bomb, as the IAEA and other experts have pointed out. Nonetheless, increasing uranium enrichment has become the basis of current claims by the US and its allies that Iran is in breach of the JCPoA and on the verge of possessing nuclear weapons. 

Under the terms of UNSC 2231, the JCPoA terminates on 18 October this year, at which point all nuclear related sanctions against Iran are due to end. However, on 28 August this year, the E3 notified the UNSC they were initiating snapback sanctions on the grounds of Iran’s ‘significant non-compliance’ with the terms of the JCPoA, These are due to kick in 30 days after notification of snapback, unless the UNSC adopts a resolution against snapback. 

In a statement to the IAEA’s Board of Governors on 8 October, Grossi confirmed he had “continuously and systematically” reached out to restore the “indispensable cooperation” with Iran, and that “progress has been made” during ongoing discussions. It remains to be seen if this is likely to influence the imposition of snapback.

Iran’s response

Throughout Trump’s election campaign and his second term in office, Iran has repeatedly called for nuclear negotiations with the US to be resumed and, until the military attack in June, continued to permit IAEA inspections. The latter were the basis on which the IAEA Director General confirmed to the UNSC that there were no credible indications that Iran has a nuclear weapons programme.

After the June attack, Iran halted IAEA inspections and threatened withdrawal from the NPT – a clear hint that a nuclear weapons programme might be pursued. This was widely reported in the western media. Since then, and noticeably less reported in the west, Iran has opened talks with the IAEA and remains a member of the NPT. 

Limited military exchanges between Israel and Iran had already taken place in April 2024, and more extensive exchanges in September-October after an Israeli airstrike killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and others. Leaked US classified documents suggest CIA involvement. The Fars News Agency, controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) released footage suggesting Israel was targeting Iran’s air defences in preparation for future attacks.

Against this background, talks between Iran and the Trump administration, which began in early March hosted by Qatar on behalf of the Gulf States, have floundered. Netanyahu’s relentless  onslaught against Palestinians across the Occupied Territories have so far proved insurmountable in Trump’s attempts to gain Gulf state support for his campaign to lever Iran into an agreement which goes beyond nuclear weapons. On the contrary, there has been limited signs that the actions of Trump and Netanyahu have resulted in a partial thaw in relations between Iran and the Gulf states.

The military attacks of 2024-25 have by and large seen the Iranian opposition retreat from the streets. As with Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and many other examples across the world, the Iranian people have united for now against their foreign invaders.

End the nuclear hypocrisy

The mendacity of Israel, the US, and the E3 is clear from the events described above, and by and large, the abject failure of western media to report the full story surrounding Iran nuclear negotiations. It should come as no surprise that the events of 2024-25 have strengthened the voice of Iranian hawks calling for withdrawal from the NPT and the development of  a nuclear weapons programme. 

Most breathtaking of all perhaps, is the hypocrisy of the United States and Europe in failing to acknowledge that Isreal has possessed nuclear weapons since the 1960s. Israel has never acknowledged it has nuclear weapons, and has never signed the NPT. 

Isreal’s nuclear weapons were disclosed by Mordecai Vanunu, an heroic Israeli whistle-blower at the Dimona nuclear plant. Vanunu spent 18 years in Israeli jails, mostly in solitary confinement, for his disclosure. He was released in 2004, but his movements are still severely restricted.

Israel’s nuclear weapons are unacknowledged by the US and its allies, and rarely mentioned by a compliant western media. 

The double standards applied to the treatment of Iran by Israel, the US, Britain, and Europe compared to the disregard of Israel’s nuclear armoury should be challenged as fiercely and as frequently by the anti-war movements across Europe and North America, as Netanyahu’s actions against Gaza have been. 

Removing Israel’s nuclear weapons is every bit as important as preventing Iran from acquiring them, and indispensable to the long-term stability of the Middle East.

  • Read Maryam Eslamdoust’s description of the shadow war in an earlier Labour CND post here.

* This article was first published on Stop the War Coalition website, 10 September 2025

Posted on

Keep Space for Peace

The Pentagon is starting to spend £200m at Croughton, building the new Joint Intelligence Analysis Centre, developing this base’s communication, command and control systems into a ‘major intelligence base’.

Oxford CND invites you to a march and rally at USAF Croughton, on Saturday 7th October, 12.00 noon – 4.00pm. See details on below leaflet and map.

Continue reading “Keep Space for Peace”

Posted on

Is the US-Korean conflict leading us into nuclear war?

As the war of words between Trump and North Korea entered its second week, newly elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in emerged onto the diplomatic stage on 16 August, declaring there’d be no second war on the Korean Peninsula. But is he right? In this video clip from China Global Television Network, Brian Becker, executive director of the US anti-war ANSWER Coalition explains some background to the conflict.

Posted on

Save Shaker Aamer – time is running out

Urgent Appeal – please sign the e-petition for the return of Shaker Aamer to the UK

100,000 signatures needed by May 14th

Labour CND is supporting this appeal from the Save Shaker Aamer Campaign and urges all CND members to sign this e-petition in order to put pressure on the Government to take immediate steps to demand the return of British Resident Shaker Aamer to the UK.

A decade of abuse and torture in Guantanamo

The e-petition was launched on 14th February by human rights lawyer, Gareth Pierce, and Shaker’s father-in-law on the day which marked Shaker Aamer’s ten years of unlawful imprisonment, torture and abuse in Guantanamo. Shaker Aamer is one of many victims of the US/UK Governments’ “war on terror” policy. Public protest succeeded in bringing home the other 15 UK Citizens and British residents who were abducted, tortured abroad and rendered to cruel detention without trial in Guantanamo.  However, Shaker Aamer still remains in Guantanamo, locked up in a steel cell, in solitary confinement, in absolute denial of all his human rights.

Fears for Shaker Aamer’s life

There are serious concerns for his health. He suffers constant pain from various medical conditions caused by years of inhumane and cruel treatment. He has been weakened by years on hunger strike in protest at the injustice and brutality suffered by those who remain in Guantanamo. His UK lawyer, Clive Stafford Smith, who visited him in November 2011, stated that Shaker is slowly dying in Guantanamo. Shaker faces no charge or trial. He was cleared for release over five years ago.

Token gestures by the UK government

The UK Government has made several requests to the US for his release and return to the UK. But, it would seem that these may be token gestures, to conceal the intent to delay his return. Shaker’s allegations of UK complicity in his torture in the presence of M15/M16 agents are serious and embarrassing to the Government. Whilst he remains in Guantanamo, his testimony has been silenced.

The latest threat to prevent Shaker’s return to the UK

The Government’s lack of action may be linked to an alarming recent report that Shaker has been visited again by Saudi officials who attempted to coerce him into signing documents agreeing to his transfer to Saudi Arabia, a country from which he fled over 28 years ago.

Complicity by the UK government

This visit could not have taken place without the agreement of the UK Government.  If Shaker is forcibly transferred to Saudi Arabia, he will be imprisoned, tortured and permanently separated from his British wife and children and the truth of his torture will never be heard. Although Shaker refused to sign, his family believe that he may be rendered there against his will at any time.

The e-petition to the Government to take urgent action to bring Shaker home may be our last hope to save him. Time is running out, please help to bring Shaker home.

The text of the e-petition:
“Shaker Aamer is a British resident with a British wife and children who has been unlawfully imprisoned without trial by the US in Bagram Air Force Base and Guantanamo Bay for over ten years. The Foreign Secretary must undertake new initiatives to achieve the immediate transfer of Shaker Aamer to the UK from continuing indefinite detention in Guantanamo Bay.”
Created by Saeed Siddique, Shaker’s father-in-law

How you can help

  • Please sign this e-petition and encourage all your family, friends and contacts to sign it too.
  • Copy this appeal, take it to your local CND group and Labour Party, sent it to your MP, local press, community organisations and councils.
  • Join Labour CND in this campaign for a victim of NATO’s war on terror policies.

Shaker Aamer is only one of many whose lives have been destroyed by the unjust policies of the UK and US Governments. Your support for this e-petition may bring him home and give him back his life. Public protests like this can prove that the pursuit of justice can, even against the odds, defeat Government policies. We must stand up against the use of over-whelming military force, abduction, torture, indefinite detention without trial, extra-judicial assassinations by drone and nuclear threats to try to give our world a future and give peace a chance.
Joy Hurcombe

Chair, Labour CND

Posted on

Nick Brown ‘arguments moving away from Trident renewal’

Taken from a House of Commons debate on the progress of defence reform and the Strategic Defence and Security Review on the 26th January.

Nick Brown (Newcastle upon Tyne East) (Lab): I want us to look again at the case for Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent. I know that that will probably not be popular on either side of the House; others can make their points as the debate progresses. Given the current circumstances, it is time to consider the question again. The Government projects a total cost of £15 billion to £20 billion for the Trident successor programme. Independent research has suggested that the total cost would come in at three or four times that figure and our past experience with such big defence programmes suggests something similar.

Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con) rose—

Mr Brown: I remember giving way to the hon. Gentleman the last time I spoke in a debate of this character, back in 2007. I bet his intervention is about the same point.

Dr Lewis: Conservative Members are nothing but consistent on this issue. I remind the right hon. Gentleman that the Polaris fleet and the Trident submarines came into service on time and within budget.

Mr Brown: The hon. Gentleman presumably hopes that that will be the case in the future. However, I challenge him to point to any other defence programme from which he could extrapolate that conclusion. I know that he follows these matters with care, but I cannot think of another programme. He is right to point out the special cases of those procurements in the past, but I am not reassured that they will be repeated in the future. In any event, that point is not at the heart of my case. No matter how one looks at it, this is a very large sum of money to spend. My point is that we should look carefully at whether we should spend it.

The maingate decision on final renewal has been pushed back until after the next general election. The cost of that is said to be an additional £1.5 billion to refurbish and prolong the lifespan of the existing fleet. Parliamentary answers from Defence Ministers show that upwards of £2 billion has already been spent on preparatory work for the manufacture of the new submarines.

The Government clearly intend to press ahead with Trident renewal. In my opinion, they should seek explicit parliamentary authority for doing so. The failure to hold a vote in Parliament on the renewal of our independent nuclear deterrent is because of the inability to reconcile different views in the coalition. The question that faces us is whether an independent nuclear deterrent is a good use of such a large sum of public money in the present circumstances. The arguments, which were never that strong, are now moving away from Trident renewal.

Dan Byles (North Warwickshire) (Con): I am listening with great interest. Does the right hon. Gentleman not agree that a long-term strategic decision, such as the replacement of our nuclear deterrent, should not be taken in the context of the current short-term economic conditions?

Mr Brown: I will come on to deal with that precise point. I have no quarrel with the hon. Gentleman for making it.

The current Trident system relies heavily on US logistical, capacity, technological and military know-how. It is nearly impossible to imagine any circumstances in which we would launch a nuclear attack, much less that we would do so independently of the Americans. Likewise, were Britain to be attacked by a nuclear power, the terms of our membership of NATO would require a joint response by all members, including the US.

Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con): Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr Brown: I cannot give way because of the rules on these things.

NATO is a mutual defence pact. It is a fundamental strength that its armoury includes the nuclear capability of the US. There has always been a question over why Britain needs to duplicate NATO’s nuclear capability, rather than more usefully supplement its conventional capacity.

When I first entered Parliament in 1983, I resisted joining the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. I did not support our decision to go ahead with an independent submarine-based system of our own. However, I did support Britain’s membership of NATO, which CND did not. At the time, that was regarded in the Labour party as a very establishment and right-wing position. It is a small irony of Labour politics that the same position is today seen as very left-wing.

When the decision was taken to adopt the Trident system in the early 1980s, there was an understanding that in exchange for non-proliferation by the non-nuclear powers, there would be restraint by the existing nuclear powers, in particular the US and Russia, when it came to further weapons development and upgrades. That idea was enshrined in article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It can be argued that that has been more honoured in the breach by countries that did not possess a nuclear capability, but that do now. The underlying principle, however, seems to me still to be sound.

The large financial outlay that the Government are committed to in planning to replace our independent deterrent could be better spent in a number of ways. During the economic boom, I argued that we ought to better equip our troops, invest in the specialist field of anti-terrorism capability in line with the real threats that we face, and supplement our existing overseas aid budget. We now face new threats. To take one example, the money that we spend on Trident could be used to bring down substantially the tuition fees of every student. I think that cutting a generation adrift from higher education poses a bigger threat to our nation than the idea that a foreign power with nuclear weaponry would uniquely threaten to use it against us, and not the rest of NATO, and would somehow be able to disapply NATO’s founding terms. The real nuclear dangers of the future come from rogue states and terrorism. The possession of an independent nuclear deterrent does not make us safer. A better investment would be in anti-terrorism capabilities.

Three main arguments are put forward by proponents of Trident replacement. The first is that it is the best weapon that money can buy. The second is that it guarantees a seat on the United Nations Security Council. The final argument is that it contributes to our ability to punch above our weight in the world. I argue that it is not much of a weapon if the circumstances in which it may be used cannot be envisaged. Fundamental reform of the United Nations Security Council is long overdue and the difficulty, as we all know, is getting agreement on what that reform should be. I also think that other countries might like us more if we stopped punching above our weight in the world. We might be better thought of by the international community if we settled for being the medium-sized European nation state that we are, rather than the imperial power that we used to be.

We have a choice as a country: do we want to continue to drift into spending billions of pounds on supplementing a nuclear capability that we already possess through NATO or do we want to spend that money on tackling the problems that Britain actually faces in squeezed economic times? Surely we should resolve this issue now with a vote in this Parliament.